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Unilateral minimum quality standards are endogenously determined as the outcome of a non-
cooperative standard-setting game between the governments of two countries. Cross-country 
externalities from the implementation of minimum quality standards are shown to give rise to 
a Prisoners’ Dilemma structure in the incentives of policy-makers leading to inefficient 
policy outcomes. The role of minimum quality standards as non-tariff barriers is examined 
and the scope for mutual gains from reciprocal adjustment in minimum standards analysed. 
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at the world optimum infeasible. 
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1 Introduction
This paper extends a well-established vertical product diﬀerentiation model to a
two-country framework in which international duopolists compete in quality and
price in each market. Unilateral minimum quality standards are endogenously
determined as the outcome of a non-cooperative standard-setting game between
the governments of the two countries. The international context highlights
the eﬀects of cross-country externalities from the implementation of minimum
quality standards that can be both positive, both negative, or asymmetric,
depending on the quality of traded goods. These externalities are shown to
give rise to a Prisoners’ Dilemma structure in the incentives of the two policy-
makers that leads to ineﬃcient policy outcomes. The role of minimum quality
standards as non-tariﬀ barriers is examined and the incentives and scope for
international cooperation analysed.
The paper contributes to both the international trade and industrial organ-
isation literature in a number of ways.
First, the paper extends the literature that examines the eﬀects of minimum
quality standards in markets where firms oﬀer vertically diﬀerentiated products
by analysing national incentives to regulate quality in an open-economy setting.
The cross-country externalities generated when countries are linked through in-
ternational trade are not present in the literature that studies quality standards
in the context of a single economy.
Second, the paper endogenously determines national minimum quality stan-
dards through the strategic interaction between policy-makers. To the best of
my knowledge, this is the first analysis that endogenises national decisions to
regulate quality in an international context. The industrial organisation litera-
ture has widely analysed the eﬀects of minimum standards in a single country,
but has done so by introducing minimum standards as exogenous constraints.
Only recently has the issue of endogenous determination of quality standards
begun to be addressed. Ecchia and Lambertini (1997) endogenously determine
the minimum quality standard in the context of one country where a social plan-
ner sets the standard to maximise national welfare. This paper extends to two
policy-makers, each of which unilaterally selects their national minimum quality
standard to maximise national welfare. The individually optimal standard are
shown to be jointly suboptimal as a result of the cross-country externalities.
Third, the analysis contributes to the literature on international cooperation
by examining whether bargaining from a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium in
minimum quality standards can lead to an eﬃcient outcome. The analysis
follows the approach of the literature on cooperation in tariﬀs (e.g. Bagwell and
Staiger, 1999, 2002; Staiger and Tabellini, 1987) but shows that endogenous
country asymmetries arising from specialisation in goods of diﬀerent quality
levels introduce constraints to cooperation that do not arise in the literature on
cooperation in tariﬀs.
The related literature on minimum quality standards originates in the in-
dustrial organisation literature, with the development of vertical quality diﬀer-
entiation models (e.g. Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1979; Shaked and Sutton, 1982).
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In his renowned paper, Ronnen (1991) uses the Shaked and Sutton framework
to demonstrate that mild minimum quality standards are welfare improving in
a duopoly where firms compete in prices and incur fixed quality-development
costs. Similar results are obtained by Crampes and Hollander (1995) assuming
that quality improvements increase variable rather than fixed costs.
The literature has more recently turned to open economy versions of the
vertically diﬀerentiated duopoly framework. Motta and Thisse (1993) analyses
the eﬀects of environmental quality standards in autarky and free trade, while
Boom (1995) analyses the eﬀects of diﬀering national standards for firms who
cannot tailor quality to diﬀerent markets. She finds that exit from the market
with the more stringent standard may occur if the diﬀerence in national mini-
mum standards is beyond a certain threshold, but does not determine national
standards endogenously through a standard-setting game.
The model in this paper diﬀers from Boom (1995) and other works assuming
up-front quality development costs (Ronnen 1991, Zhou et al., 2000, Herguera
et al., 2002, among others), by assuming firms incur quality dependent variable
costs (as in Motta, 1993, Crampes and Hollander, 1994, and Lutz, 2005). Hence
the model applies more closely to industries where quality improvements stem
from higher quality of materials or ingredients or other factors embedded in
the production process (e.g. textiles) rather than from innovative characteris-
tics or design that arise from up-front investment in research and development
(e.g. pharmaceuticals). The advantage of this cost specification is it gives firms
the flexibility to tailor quality levels to diﬀerent markets and to thus respond
endogenously and asymmetrically to diﬀerent quality standards.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and
characterises the unregulated equilibria. Section 3 examines national incentives
for standard-setting and solves for the non-cooperative Nash equilibria in min-
imum quality standards. The properties of these are examined and contrasted
to world welfare-maximising international standards. International cooperation
in setting quality standards is analysed in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
This section describes the economic environment of the two-country model of
vertical product diﬀerentiation and characterises the unregulated equilibria.
This lays the groundwork for the rest of the paper that analyses the non-
cooperative standard-setting game between policy-makers and examines the
scope and eﬀects of international cooperation in standard-setting. The un-
derlying quality diﬀerentiation model is closest to Motta (1993), Crampes and
Hollander (1995) and Ecchia and Lambertini (1997) for a single economy.
2.1 Economic Environment
Consider two segmented markets, A and B, with a single firm located in each
(firms A and B). The firms compete in quality and prices in each market,
3
producing a vertically diﬀerentiated good. The firms can supply goods of a
single quality level in each market but are able to diﬀerentiate the quality of
their exports from the quality of their domestic sales. Quality can be defined
as follows: if A and B have the same price level and all consumers prefer A to
B, then A is said to be of higher quality than B. Let qij be the quality level of
the good produced in country i (by firm i) and consumed in country j, where
i, j ∈ {A,B}. We assume no upper bound to quality level so qij ∈ [0,∞). There
is no potential entry of additional firms, but the duopolists may choose not to
supply goods to either or both markets. Finally, we assume no transport costs.
The firms interact in a two-stage game. In the first stage, firms non-
cooperatively select quality levels qAA, qAB and qBB, qBA, respectively. Perfect
and costless commitment to these quality levels is assumed. Firms compete in
prices in the second stage, given first stage quality levels. Firms have access to
the same production technology, which involves variable costs that are convex
in quality and linear in quantity. No sunk costs of quality development are
assumed1. Let V (Sij,qij) denote variable costs of production as a function of
quality, qij , and sales, Sij , of firm i in market j, where these are as in (1):
V (Sij,qij) = bq
2
ijSij , where b > 0 (1)
Convexity in quality is both necessary and suﬃcient for the existence of an
interior solution2 for quality choice in stage 1, and can thus be accompanied by
an unlimited range for quality level qij .
The demand side is assumed to consist of a continuum of consumers in
each market with a varying taste parameter3, θ. Consumers are uniformly
distributed, with unit density, over the interval
£
0, θ
¤
and derive utility from
the first unit of purchase only. The indirect utility function of a consumer with
taste parameter θ, purchasing a unit of a good with quality q and price p is
described by (2):
U = θq − p (2)
Given firms’ decisions (qij,pij), consumers in each market choose between (i)
purchasing one unit of the good from firm A, (ii) purchasing one unit of the
1Note that the absence of fixed sunk costs of quality development implies the equilibrium
choice of qualities and prices would not change if firms chose these simultaneously and non-
cooperatively, rather than sequentially and non-cooperatively. The sequential structure is
preserved for purposes of comparability with the related literature.
2There is no interior solution for firm quality levels if the variable cost function is non-
convex. For example, if variable costs are linear in quality, e.g. V (q) = cq, the low quality
firm’s best response is a quality level 4
7
that of the high quality firm, while the high quality
firm adds to profit by raising quality without limit (e.g. Choi and Shin, 1992). A solution can
only be pinned down by assuming quality has a finite upper limit, q, where the high quality
firm locates.
3Parameter θ may also be interpreted as the inverse of the marginal rate of substitution
between income and quality such that a consumer with a higher θ has a lower marginal rate of
substitution between income and quality and thus a higher income. With this interpretation
the framework presented is analogous to models where consumers vary in their income level
rather than preference over quality e.g Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979), Shaked and Sutton
(1982).
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good from firm B, or (iii) making no purchase. Consumers receive zero utility
if they do not buy the good. Note that since the minimum value for θ is zero,
there is always a measure of consumers who prefer not to buy the good when
prices are positive, implying incomplete market coverage. Parameter θ measures
market size, which is symmetric in both countries.
Further suppose the governments of countries A and B have the opportunity
to regulate quality in their market by unilaterally setting minimum quality
standards in a stage 0, prior to the strategic interaction of firms. Governments
choose standards to maximise national welfare, anticipating firms’ optimal price
and quality responses.
The solution concept employed to solve the multi-stage game is subgame
perfect equilibrium (SPE), found by backward induction. First, the unique
second-stage equilibrium in prices is analysed and firms’ payoﬀs described in
terms of first-stage qualities. Second, optimal first stage quality decisions of
firms are examined. This allows the unregulated equilibria to be characterised.
Then, the eﬀects of minimum quality standards are examined, yielding the reg-
ulated optimal quality responses of firms. Finally, the incentives for standard
setting are analysed and the non-cooperative Nash equilibria in minimum stan-
dards characterised. The issue of international cooperation in standard setting
is analysed in the next section of the paper.
2.2 The Price-Setting Subgame
Firms A and B compete in prices in each market in the final stage of the game,
given stage 1 quality levels. It is common practice in the industrial organisation
literature with one market to arbitrarily assign one firm as high quality, solving
for equilibrium prices and qualities assuming an exogenous quality ranking be-
tween firms. Rather than assigning a particular quality ordering between firms
in each market, we suppose that in each market j, there is a ‘high’ quality sup-
plier (H), with quality level qHj , and a ‘low’ quality supplier (L), with quality
level qLj , where qHj ≥ qLj . This allows for the possibility that firms choose
identical quality levels in stage 1. The associated price levels of these goods are
denoted by pHj and pLj , respectively. We proceed to characterise equilibrium
prices and qualities for the H and L quality goods supplied in each market and
then examine the multiple equilibria that correspond to diﬀerent configurations
of quality rankings of firms A and B in the two markets.
Hence, in the final stage of the game, firm quality levels are fixed in market
j, such that qHj ≥ qLj . Let xHj and xLj denote quality-deflated prices for the
H and L goods, respectively, and let rj denote the quality ratio, such that:
xHj ≡
pHj
qHj
and xLj ≡
pLj
qLj
(3)
rj ≡
qHj
qLj
(4)
Consider the structure of demand for the two goods. Let zj denote the
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preference parameter of the marginal consumer in market j who is indiﬀerent
between purchasing one unit of the good of quality qHj at price pHj and one
unit of the good of quality qLj at price pLj . The marginal consumer zj follows
directly from (2) and is given by:
zj =
pHj − pLj
qHj − qLj
=
rjxHj − xLj
rj − 1
(5)
Moreover, let kj denote the preference level of the consumer who is indiﬀerent
between buying the diﬀerentiated good and not making a purchase. Consump-
tion of one unit of the good of quality qLj at price pLj yields zero utility for this
consumer, so from (2) it follows that kj ≡ xLj = pLjqLj . Hence, consumers with
preference parameter zj ≤ θ ≤ θ purchase good H and consumers for whom
xLj ≤ θ < zj purchase good L. Consumers with 0 ≤ θ < xLj make no purchase.
The quantity demand for H and L goods in market j, and thus firm sales,
are denoted by SHj and SLj , respectively, and given by:
SHj = θ − zj = θ −
pHj − pLj
qHj − qLj
(6)
SLj = zj − xLj =
pHj − pLj
qHj − qLj
− pLj
qLj
(7)
The corresponding profits, ΠHj and ΠLj , from H and L sales in market j,
are thus:
ΠHj =
¡
pHj − bq2Hj
¢ ¡
θ − zj
¢
(8)
ΠLj =
¡
pLj − bq2Lj
¢
(zj − xLj) (9)
Substituting for zj and rearranging yields:
ΠHj =
1
rj − 1
qHj (xHj − bqHj)
¡
θ (rj − 1)− rjxHj + xLj
¢
(10)
ΠLj =
rj
rj − 1
qHj (xLj − bqLj) (xHj − xLj) (11)
Maximising ΠHj with respect to xHj , given xLj and rj , yields the quality-
deflated price reaction function (RH) of firm H in j:
xHj (xLj) =
1
2rj
£
θ (rj − 1) + brjqHj + xLj
¤
(12)
Maximising ΠLj with respect to xLj , given xHj and rj, yields the reaction
function (RL) of firm L in j :
xLj (xHj) =
1
2
(bqLj + xHj) (13)
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The slopes of the price reaction functions, dxHjdxLj |RH
= 12rj and
dxHj
dxLj |RL
= 2,
respectively, confirm prices are strategic complements. Moreover, if qHj > qLj
in stage 1, then rj > 1 and xHj > xLj , while if qHj = qLj in stage 1, then rj = 1
and (12) and (13) imply that xHj = xLj .
Solving (12) and (13) simultaneously yields the unique Nash equilibrium in
quality-deflated prices, in terms of parameters b, θ, and firm quality levels:
xHj =
1
4qHj − qLj
¡
2qHjθ − 2qLjθ + 2bq2Hj + bq2Lj
¢
(14)
xLj =
1
4qHj − qLj
¡
qHjθ − qLjθ + bq2Hj + 2bqHjqLj
¢
(15)
Substituting (14) and (15) into (5) yields the equilibrium marginal consumer
zj :
zj =
1
4qHj − qLj
¡
2qHjθ − qLjθ + 2bq2Hj + bqHjqLj
¢
(16)
Equilibrium prices follow directly from (14) and (15):
pHj =
qHj
4qHj − qLj
¡
2θ (qHj − qLj) + 2bq2Hj + bq2Lj
¢
(17)
pLj =
qLj
4qHj − qLj
¡
θ (qHj − qLj) + bq2Hj + 2bqHjqLj
¢
(18)
Inspection of (17) and (18) reveals the quality gap, (qHj − qLj), to be a key
determinant of prices. If firms choose identical quality levels qHj = qLj = qj ,
then the quality gap is zero and prices collapse to marginal cost, pHj = pLj =
bq2j . The Bertrand outcome for homogeneous goods where price is equal to
marginal cost and firm profits are zero results. This drives the quality diﬀeren-
tiation result of the literature, confirmed in the next section.
2.3 Nash Equilibrium in Firm Qualities
Anticipating the price implications of their quality decisions, firms set quality
levels non-cooperatively in stage 1. Substituting (17) and (18) into (6) and (7)
gives demands in terms of stage 1 qualities:
SHj = θ − zj =
qHj
4qHj − qLj
¡
2θ − 2bqHj − bqLj
¢
(19)
SLj = zj − xLj =
qHj
4qHj − qLj
¡
θ + bqHj − bqLj
¢
(20)
It is now straightforward to express firms’ first stage profits as a function of
quality levels, market size and the cost parameter:
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ΠHj(qHj, qLj) = (qHj − qLj)
q2Hj
¡
2θ − 2bqHj − bqLj
¢2
(4qHj − qLj)2
(21)
ΠLj(qHj, qLj) = (qHj − qLj)
qHjqLj
¡
θ + bqHj − bqLj
¢2
(4qHj − qLj)2
(22)
The profit equations confirm that firms can only earn positive profits when
a quality gap is established in stage 1. Profits are aﬀected by quality choice
in two ways. Firms trade oﬀ the cost of producing a higher quality good with
the higher price made possible by the higher quality level, but also consider the
disparity in quality levels, which aﬀects the intensity of price competition. The
quality levels in the unregulated equilibrium are found by solving the following
system of first-order conditions, that captures these two eﬀects:
∂ΠHj(qHj , qLj)
∂qHj
=
qHj
¡
2bqHj + bqLj − 2θ
¢
(4qHj − qLj)3
(24bq3Hj − 22bq2HjqLj + 5bqHjq2Lj
(23)
+2bq3Lj − 4q2Hjθ + 6qHjqLjθ − 8q2Ljθ) = 0
∂ΠLj(qHj , qLj)
∂qLj
=
qHj
¡
θ + bqHj − bqLj
¢
(4qHj − qLj)3
(4bq3Hj − 19bq2HjqLj + 17bqHjq2Lj
(24)
−2bq3Lj + 4q2Hjθ − 7qHjqLjθ) = 0
The first order conditions simplify to (25) and (26) implicitly define the
quality reaction functions of the two firms, qHj (qLj) and qLj (qHj):
24bq3Hj − 22bq2HjqLj + 5bqHjq2Lj + 2bq3Lj − 4q2Hjθ + 6qHjqLjθ − 8q2Ljθ = 0
(25)
4bq3Hj − 19bq2HjqLj + 17bqHjq2Lj − 2bq3Lj + 4q2Hjθ − 7qHjqLjθ = 0 (26)
Confirming a maximum, the analytical expressions for qHj (qLj) and qLj (qHj)
can be found. These are not included in the main text due to their length, but
can be found in Appendix A. The reaction functions are illustrated for param-
eter values θ = 5 and b = 12 in figure (1), and shown to be positively sloped,
indicating that firm quality levels are strategic complements. The intuition be-
hind the upward sloping qHj (qLj) reaction function is straightforward. A rise
in qLj narrows the quality gap, thereby intensifying stage 2 price competition.
The high quality firm thus has an incentive to increase its quality in order to
widen the quality gap and alleviate competition. The convexity of costs with
respect to quality ensures it is not optimal for the high quality firm to fully
oﬀset the impact of higher qLj and thus qHj (qLj) has a slope less than 1.
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6
4
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qHj
qLj
qLj(qHj) qHj(qLj)
qLj= qHj
qHjUR
qLjUR
0
Figure 1: Unregulated Nash equilibrium in qualities.
The upward sloping reaction function of the low quality firm, qLj (qHj), is
less straightforward, since an increase in qHj widens the quality gap, relaxing
price competition. The intuition behind the relationship is that the low quality
firm’s revenue is increasing in its own quality level, but its ability to raise qLj
is constrained by the stronger price competition that ensues. The alleviation
of price competition through a higher qHj thus permits an increase in qLj , that
would otherwise not be optimal.
Since product diﬀerentiation relaxes ex post price competition4, firms find
it optimal to oﬀer distinct quality levels in equilibrium. Solving (25) and (26)
simultaneously yields the unregulated equilibrium quality levels qURHj = 0.40976
θ
b
and qURLj = 0.19936
θ
b . They are increasing in market size, but decreasing in the
cost parameter of the model.
In the context of the two-country model, either high or low quality goods
are imported by j. The larger the market size of country j, or the higher is
the highest income level (depending on the interpretation of θ), then the higher
the quality of traded goods of a given type. The results of the model are thus
consistent with recent empirical studies that find a positive relationship between
the quality of traded goods and country size and income (Hallak, 2006; Hummels
4This result is reminiscent of the well-known result of Kreps and Scheinkman (1983), where
duopolists choose capacity constraints and then compete in prices. The incentive to constrain
output in order to alleviate price competition gives rise to the Cournot outcome. Commit-
ment to quality diﬀerentiation serves a similar purpose in the vertical product diﬀerentiation
literature, but there are key diﬀerences; quality-diﬀerentiated goods command diﬀerent prices,
so firms are asymmetric in equilibrium. In contrast, capacity constraints serve to uniformly
raise price above marginal cost preserving the symmetry between firms.
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and Klenow, 2005).
Substituting equilibrium qualities qURHj = 0.40976
θ
b and q
UR
Lj = 0.19936
θ
b
into the prices, sales, and profit equations fully characterises the unregulated
equilibrium. The results are reported in table (1).
The consumer surplus in j, Cj , is comprised by the surplus of consumers of
high quality goods H, denoted by CHj , and of consumers of low quality goods L,
denoted by CLj . Integrating utility over the relevant range of consumers gives
the expressions (27), (28) and (29), expressed in terms of firm quality levels and
model parameters θ and b. Substituting for equilibrium quality levels yields
consumer surplus in the unregulated equilibrium, reported in table (2).
CHj =
Z θ
zj
(θqHj − pHj) dθ (27)
=
q2Hj
¡
2θ − 2bqHj − bqLj
¢
2 (4qHj − qLj)2
¡
bqHjθ + bqLjθ − 2bq2Lj − 2bq2Hj + bqLjqHj
¢
CLj =
Z zj
xLj
(θqLj − pLj) dθ (28)
=
q2HjqLj
2 (4qHj − qLj)2
¡
θ + bqHj − bqLj
¢2
Cj = CHj + CLj
=
q2Hj
2 (4qHj − qLj)2
(3b2q3Lj − 2bqLjqHjθ + 4b2q3Hj + b2qLjq2Hj
+ b2q2LjqHj + 5qLjθ
2 − 8bq2Ljθ + 4qHjθ
2 − 8bq2Hjθ) (29)
The Unregulated Market j
Quality levels qURHj = 0.40976
θ
b q
UR
Lj = 0.19936
θ
b
Quality ratio rj = 2.0554
Quality gap qHj − qLj = 0.2104 θb
Prices pHj = 0.22666θ
2
b pLj = 0.075010
θ
2
b
Quality-deflated prices xHj = 0.53314θ xLj = 0.37625θ
Marginal consumer zj = 0.72075θ
Sales SHj = 0.27925θ SLj = 0.3445θ
Profits ΠHj = 0.016407 θ
3
b ΠLj = 0.012149
θ
3
b
Consumer surplus Cj = 0.046985 θ
3
b
Table 1: The Unregulated Market
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2.4 Firm Quality Rankings and Multiple Equilibria
Sections 2.2 and 2.3 solve for unregulated equilibrium prices and qualities in
each market, without specifying which of the two firms, A or B, is the high
or low quality supplier in each market. The assumption that firms can freely
choose quality levels for domestic and export sales and the absence of transport
costs gives rise to four possible equilibria:
1. Each firm supplies its home market with low quality goods and exports
high quality goods, so qAA < qBA and qAB > qBB. Countries trade in
high quality goods.
2. Each firm supplies its home market with high quality goods and exports
low quality goods, so qAA > qBA and qAB < qBB. Countries trade in low
quality goods.
3. Firm A is the world high quality supplier, so qAA > qBA and qAB > qBB.
Country B imports high quality goods from A while A imports low quality
goods from B.
4. Firm B is the world high quality supplier, so qAA < qBA and qAB < qBB.
Country A imports high quality goods from B while B imports low quality
goods from A.
Hence the model gives rise to three possible trade patterns. Countries may
trade in high quality goods, low quality goods, or bilateral trade may be in
goods of diﬀerent quality levels (equilibria 3 and 4 are symmetric).
The welfare of a country is measured as the sum of consumer surplus and
profits of the domestic firm from domestic sales and exports. The welfare of each
country thus depends on the quality rankings of firms in each market, and hence
on the pattern of trade in equilibrium. While world welfare, denoted by W ,
is unchanged between equilibria, the distribution of welfare between countries
varies. Consumer surplus is symmetric between countries at Cj = 0.046985 θ
3
b
but the higher profits earned from H sales in the unregulated equilibrium imply
higher welfare from a higher quality ranking of firm j relative to the foreign
firm.
Equations (30) to (33) give the welfare equations for country A under the
four equilibrium configurations:
WA|qAA<qBA,qAB>qBB = CA +ΠLA +ΠHB (30)
WA|qAA>qBA,qAB<qBB = CA +ΠHA +ΠLB (31)
WA|qAA>qBA,qAB>qBB = CA +ΠHA +ΠHB (32)
WA|qAA<qBA,qAB<qBB = CA +ΠLA +ΠLB (33)
Correspondingly, equations (34) to (37) describe welfare for country B under
the four equilibrium configurations:
11
WB|qAA<qBA,qAB>qBB = CB +ΠHA +ΠLB (34)
WB|qAA>qBA,qAB<qBB = CB +ΠLA +ΠHB (35)
WB|qAA>qBA,qAB>qBB = CB +ΠLA +ΠLB (36)
WB|qAA<qBA,qAB<qBB = CB +ΠHA +ΠHB (37)
Combining the unregulated market outcome reported in table (2) with welfare
equations (30) to (33) and (34) to (37) yields the unregulated welfare levels in
table (3) for the four equilibrium configurations.
Unregulated Equilibrium Welfare Distribution
Firm Rankings WA WB W
(1) qAA < qBA, qAB > qBB 0.075541 θ
3
b 0.075541
θ
3
b 0.151082
θ
3
b
(2) qAA > qBA, qAB < qBB 0.075541 θ
3
b 0.075541
θ
3
b 0.151082
θ
3
b
(3) qAA > qBA, qAB > qBB 0.079799 θ
3
b 0.071283
θ
3
b 0.151082
θ
3
b
(4) qAA < qBA, qAB < qBB 0.071283 θ
3
b 0.079799
θ
3
b 0.151082
θ
3
b
Table 2: Welfare distribution in the unregulated equilibria.
Table (3) shows the asymmetric distribution of welfare in equilibria (3) and
(4) where national firms are either world quality leaders or world low quality
suppliers. Equilibria (1) and (2) give rise to symmetric welfare eﬀects in the
unregulated equilibrium. This symmetry is not preserved, however, in the regu-
lated equilibrium where governments set minimum standards non-cooperatively,
as is made clear in the next section.
3 Non-CooperativeMinimumQuality Standards
This section endogenises the choice of minimum quality standards in the two
countries, where these are the result of a non-cooperative standard-setting game
between the governments of A and B. The objective function of each policy-
maker is to maximise national welfare, taking as given the minimum standard
of the other country, while anticipating the optimal quality response of the high
quality firm and ensuing duopolistic price competition.
The industrial organisation literature on minimum quality standards has
only recently endogenised the choice of national minimum quality standard (Ec-
chia and Lambertini,1997), prior to which standards were modelled as exoge-
nous constraints. This paper extends the analysis to examine the incentives
for standard-setting in an international context, thereby showing the eﬀects of
cross-country externalities and the role of trade patterns in shaping national
incentives. Section 2.4 establishes the three possible trade patterns that arise
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as equilibria of the two-country model. These in turn correspond to three non-
cooperative Nash equilibria in minimum standards.
The section first examines the eﬀects of minimum quality standards on key
market variables that influence national decisions. The government reaction
functions in minimum standards are then examined and the Nash equilibria in
minimum quality standards characterised. These are contrasted to the world
optimum pair of quality standards and the role of unilateral standards as non-
tariﬀ barriers to trade is analysed.
3.1 The Eﬀects of Minimum Quality Standards
The welfare improving eﬀects of minimum quality standards in a single market
with two price-competing duopolists was first found in Ronnen (1991) and is
a feature of the subsequent literature, such as Crampes and Hollander (1995)
and more recently Ecchia and Lambertini (1997). It is common to the literature
that the intensity of price competition induces a greater degree of quality dif-
ferentiation than is optimal from a social welfare perspective, which a minimum
standard can correct by narrowing the quality gap between the two goods and
raising both quality levels.
As the next few sections show, the incentive to regulate is also a feature of
the two-country model, but the open economy characteristics of the frame-
work distort policy-makers’ incentives to correct the ineﬃciency in quality-
diﬀerentiation. This section analyses the eﬀects of a minimum quality stan-
dard, sj, in country j, such that sj > qURLj . The related industrial organisation
literature usually examines the eﬀects of ‘mild’ minimum standards as exoge-
nous constraints, defined as a standard in between the two unregulated qualities,
qURHj > s
j > qURLj . Since s
j is determined endogenously in this model as a result of
a strategic game between policy-makers, we prefer not to restrict policy-makers’
strategy space through a priori assumptions about whether unilaterally selected
standard are ‘mild’ or ‘severe’, i.e. sj ≥ qURHj > qURLj . The eﬀects of sj on key
market variables, for the range of values consistent with both firms remaining
in market j, are summarised by the following:
(i) The quality levels of both firms increase and the degree of quality diﬀer-
entiation decreases: qLj > qURLj as a result of the binding standard, and
qHj(sj) > qURHj as a result of the strategic complementarity between quality
levels. The standard has the eﬀect of raising the quality of the low quality
firm closer to that of its rival. As discussed in section 2.3, the optimal
response for the high quality firm to raise its own quality level to alleviate
the price competition induced by the implementation of a minimum qual-
ity standard. The convexity of costs ensures that the high quality firm’s
quality rises less than proportionally, as a result of the trade-oﬀ between
the intensified price competition that a smaller quality gap implies and
the convex costs of quality improvement. The high quality firm’s qual-
ity response to minimum standard standard sj is found by substituting
qLj = sj into the high quality firm’s reaction function, implicitly defined
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by (25), which yields qHj(sj), the optimal response of the high quality
firm5 to standard sj . Figure (2) illustrates the path of quality levels and
65432
6.25
5
3.75
2.5
1.25
0 sj
qHj, rj
qHj(sj)
r(sj)
1
qLj = sj
qHjUR
qLjUR
sPj = 20/3
qLjUR
Figure 2: Regulated equilibrium qualities.
the quality ratio rj with minimum standard sj for θ = 5 and b = 12 . As the
severity of the minimum standard increases, the quality ratio converges to
1, while the quality gap converges to zero. Let sPj denote the ‘prohibitive’
minimum standard in country j, at which quality levels are equal. The en-
suing price competition is at its strongest and both firms earn zero profit.
sPj is thus the highest standard consistent with the survival of both firms
in market j. For standards s > sPj , firms would make losses6 giving rise
to exit. Solving qHj(sPj) = qLj = sPj yields the general expression for
sPj :
sPj =
2θ
3b
(38)
The larger the market, or the lower is firm cost, then the higher the
maximum standard consistent with a duopolistic outcome. For θ = 5
and b = 12 , s
Pj = 203 as illustrated in figure (2).
(ii) Prices are increasing and converging over sj ∈
h
qURLj ,
2θ
3b
i
. There are two
conflicting eﬀects on price levels. First, a higher sj implies higher quality
levels for both firms and thus higher variable costs, that are increasing at
5The analytical expression for qHj(sj) can be found in Appendix A.
6Note that if firms incur a fixed costs of production in addition to the variable cost spec-
ification assumed, the threshold standard above which exit occurs is lower than sPj . For
simplicity, fixed costs are set at zero.
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an increasing rate due to the convexity assumption. Second, the conver-
gence of quality levels intensifies price competition, moderating the im-
pact of costs of price levels. The cost eﬀects dominate under the assump-
tions of the model, in contrast to other contributions, where prices fall
with standards (e.g. Ronnen, 1991, Boom, 1995). Substituting qLj = sj
and qHj(sj) into price equations (17) and (18) yields pHj(sj , b, θ) and
pLj(sj , b, θ), which are confirmed to be increasing in sj , while the price
gap is declining in sj . Figure (3) illustrates pHj(sj , b, θ) and pLj(sj , b, θ)
for θ = 5 and b = 12 .
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Figure 3: Regulated equilibrium prices.
(iii) Profits of the high quality supplier decrease with standard sj and profits
of the low quality increase with standards up to a certain threshold level,
s, above which they also decline. Substituting qLj = sj and qHj(sj) into
the profit equations (21) and (22) yield ΠHj(sj , b, θ) and ΠLj(sj , b, θ),
from which ∂ΠHj(s
j ,b,θ)
∂sj < 0 is confirmed. Solving
∂ΠLj(s
j ,b,θ)
∂sj = 0 and
confirming the maximum yields threshold level:
s = 0.27763
θ
b
(39)
Hence, ∂ΠLj(s
j ,b,θ)
∂sj > 0 for s
j ∈
£
qURLj , s
¤
and ∂ΠLj(s
j ,b,θ)
∂sj < 0 for s
j ∈£
s, sPj
¤
. The path of firm profits earned from high and low quality sales in
j is illustrated for θ = 5 and b = 12 in figure (4). The economic mechanism
for these contrasting eﬀects operates through the narrowing quality gap
and price implications of sj . As the quality gap narrows, some consumers
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switch from consuming the high quality good to consuming the low qual-
ity good. At the same time, the increasing prices imply some consumers
switch from consuming low quality goods to not making any purchase.
From (16), (15) and (25), ∂zj∂sj > 0 and
∂xLj
∂sj > 0. The implications of
the increase in the preference parameter of the marginal consumers, is
an unambiguous decline in demand for high quality goods with sj , low-
ering ΠHj . This negative relationship is common feature of the related
literature. The low quality firm enjoys a larger overall market share for
suﬃciently low sj but beyond a threshold bbs, the stronger price competi-
tion dominates the market share eﬀect and profits decline. Expressing low
quality sales in terms of sj , b and θ by substituting qLj = sj and qHj(sj)
into (20) allows threshold level bbs to be computed from ∂SLJ(sj ,b,θ)∂sj = 0 in
terms of model parameters:
bbs = 0.34104θ
b
(40)
It thus follows that ∂SLJ (s
j ,b,θ)
∂sj > 0 for s
j ∈
h
qURLj ,
bbsi and ∂SLJ(sj ,b,θ)∂sj < 0
for sj ∈
hbbs, sPji. Ronnen (1991) and Crampes and Hollander (1995) find
a similar pattern for profits, while Boom (1995) finds losses for both firms
as a result of assumptions that keep market shares constant. The eﬀects
of sj on firm profits and sales are illustrated in figures (4)-(6) for θ = 5
and b = 12 .
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(iv) There are two conflicting eﬀects of minimum quality standards on con-
sumer surplus under variable quality costs. First, the convexity of unit
costs implies higher prices as a result of higher quality levels, an eﬀect
which is exacerbated by firms’ strategic responses to each others’ price
increases. Second, stronger price competition associated with diminished
quality disparity has a positive eﬀect on total consumer surplus. The
pro-competitive eﬀect of sj dominates the cost eﬀect for standards up to a
threshold level bs, above which the converse is true. Equation (29) describes
total consumer surplus as a function of quality levels and parameters b and
θ. Substituting qLj = sj and qHj(sj) into Cj yields Cj(sj , b, θ). Solving
∂Cj(s
j ,b,θ)
∂sj = 0 and confirming the maximum yields threshold level:
bs = 3.668θ
b
(41)
It follows that ∂Cj(s
j ,b,θ)
∂sj > 0 for s
j ∈
£
qURLj , bs¤ and ∂Cj(sj ,b,θ)∂sj < 0 for
sj ∈
£bs, sPj¤. The path of consumer surplus is illustrated for θ = 5 and
b = 12 in figure (7). Note the eﬀect of s
j on consumers is not uniform.
Crampes and Hollander (1995) obtain the result that all consumers gain
for suﬃciently low minimum quality standards, under similar assumptions.
For a higher standard, however, the higher costs and prices induce losses
in high quality consumers, relative to low quality consumers, who increase
in number as an increasing measure switches to purchasing the low quality
good. Ecchia and Lambertini (1997) show that all consumers lose for a
suﬃciently high standard. Hence, as sj rises over sj ∈
£
qURLj , bs¤, welfare is
being redistributed from the supplier of high quality goods to the supplier
of low quality goods and to consumers in aggregate, but also between
consumers of high quality goods to consumers of low quality goods.
The eﬀects of sj on Cj and ΠHj and ΠLj described in this section shape the
incentives of policy-makers in the standard-setting game. Section 3.2 examines
these incentives more closely.
3.2 National Incentives
In stage 0, the governments of A and B are assumed to set minimum quality
standards sA and sB simultaneously and non-cooperatively, under the assump-
tion that both firms remain in the market, taking the strategic interaction of the
firms and the resulting eﬀects on market variables as given. In section 3.1 the
‘prohibitive’ standard, sPj , which defines the highest minimum quality standard
consistent with the survival of both firms in market j, is found to be sPj = 2θ3b .
Hence, the strategy space of each policy-maker of country j is sj ∈
£
qURLj , s
Pj
¤
.
The policy-maker of each country j chooses sj from within this strategy space
to maximise its national welfare, W j , taking the standard of the other country
as given.
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Recall that policy decision sj , gives rise to a strategic response of the high
quality firm in market j, qHj(sj). Substituting the reaction function qHj(sj)
implicit7 in (25) and qLj = sj into equations (29), (21) and (22), yields consumer
surplus and profits from the sale of high and low quality goods in market j, as
functions of policy variable sj and market parameters θ and b. These are defined
generally as Cj(sj , θ, b), ΠHj(sj , θ, b) and ΠLj(sj , θ, b).
Consider welfare equations (42) and (43) that describe the objective func-
tions of governments A and B in terms of sA, sB and parameters θ and b:
WA
¡
sA, sB , θ, b
¢
= CA(sA, θ, b) +ΠAA(sA, θ, b) +ΠAB(sB, θ, b) (42)
WB
¡
sA, sB , θ, b
¢
= CB(sA, θ, b) +ΠBB(sB, θ, b) +ΠBA(sA, θ, b) (43)
Suppressing market and cost parameters b and θ for convenience, the gov-
ernments’ reaction functions are implicitly defined by (44) and (45):
∂WA(sA, sB)
∂sA |sB
=
∂CA(sA)
∂sA
+
∂ΠAA(sA)
∂sA
= 0 (44)
∂WB(sA, sB)
∂sB |sA
=
∂CB(sB)
∂sB
+
∂ΠBB(sB)
∂sB
= 0 (45)
For a pair of standards (sA∗, sB∗) to constitute a Nash equilibrium in mini-
mum standards, the pair must solve both (44) and (45). Since the distribution of
consumers is symmetric in the two markets, the choice of the minimum standard
is influenced symmetrically by its eﬀect Cj(sj) in the two countries. Recall from
section 3.1 that
∂Cj(sj)
∂sj > 0 holds for a range of values s
j ∈
£
qURL , bs¤, wherebs = 3.668 θb , providing incentives to regulate. Asymmetries in incentives for
setting minimum quality standards hinge on the quality of its domestic sales.
If firm A supplies its home market with high quality goods, then domestic
profit is unambiguously lowered by the implementation of sA > qURL , since
∂ΠAA(s
A)
∂sA =
∂ΠHA(s
A)
∂sA < 0. In contrast, if firm A is a supplier of low quality
goods then profit from domestic sales is increasing with sA for suﬃciently low
minimum standards, sA ∈
£
qURL , s
¤
, where s = 0.27763 θb . Similar arguments
apply for country B.
Moreover, inspection of the implicit reaction functions of A and B, given by
(44) and (45), respectively, reveals that while the level of WA and WB depend
on both sA and sB, the optimal responses of the two policy-makers depend
only on the quality ranking of the national firm in the domestic market and
parameters b and θ. The policy-makers’ optimal choice of minimum standard
thus involves a trade-oﬀ between the gains to domestic consumers and the eﬀects
on domestic profit, which is unaﬀected by the foreign standard but depends on
the quality of domestically produced goods. The discussion is summarised by
proposition (1).
7The analytical expression for qHj(sj) can be found in Appendix A.
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Proposition 1 A country’s optimal unilateral minimum quality standard is
higher when the domestic firm is the low quality supplier in the domestic market,
than if the domestic firm is the high quality supplier.
Proof. Let W jH denote the welfare of a country j when the domestic firm
is the high quality supplier in j and W jL denote welfare when the domestic firm
is the low quality supplier in j. Further, let Πji denote the profit of firm j from
exports (of unspecified quality) to i, where i 6= j. Hence (suppressing market
and cost parameters b and θ):
W jH
¡
si, sj
¢
= Cj
¡
sj
¢
+ΠHj
¡
sj
¢
+Πji
¡
si
¢
(46)
W jL
¡
si, sj
¢
= Cj
¡
sj
¢
+ΠLj
¡
sj
¢
+Πji
¡
si
¢
(47)
Let sjH and s
j
Ldenote the optimal unilateral standard when W
j = W jH and
when W j = W jL, respectively, given s
i. Since Πji
¡
si
¢
is not a function of
the domestic standard sj , optimal standard sjH = argmaxsj W
j
H
¡
si, sj
¢
=
argmaxsj cW jH ¡sj¢ and sjL = argmaxsj W jL ¡si, sj¢ = argmaxsj cW jL ¡sj¢, wherecW jH ¡sj¢ = Cj ¡sj¢ + ΠHj ¡sj¢ and cW jL ¡sj¢ = Cj ¡sj¢ + ΠLj ¡sj¢. Recall that
∂ΠHj(sj)
∂sj < 0 for all s
j and
∂ΠLj(sj)
∂sj > 0 for s
j ∈
£
qURL , s
¤
, while
∂Cj(sj)
∂sj > 0
for sj ∈
£
qURL , bs¤. It follows that argmaxsj cW jH ¡sj¢ < argmaxsj cW jL ¡sj¢ and
hence sjH < s
j
L.
In general, the policy-maker finds it optimal to set sjH that solves (48), or
sjL that solves (49), depending on whether the domestic firm is a high or low
quality supplier in j:
∂Cj(sj , θ, b)
∂sj
+
∂ΠHj(sj , θ, b)
∂sj
= 0 (48)
∂Cj(sj , θ, b)
∂sj
+
∂ΠLj(sj , θ, b)
∂sj
= 0 (49)
Solving (48) and (49) yields non-cooperative standards sjH = 0.23995
θ
b and
sjL = 0.34691
θ
b , respectively. In the former case, the policy-maker sets a rela-
tively ‘soft’ unilateral standard, while in the latter case a relatively ‘tough’ stan-
dard is set. Symmetry across countries implies that sAH = s
B
H = s
S = 0.23995 θb
and sAL = s
B
L = s
T = 0.34691 θb , where s
S denotes the ‘soft’ unilateral qual-
ity standard and sT ‘tough’ unilateral standard. Both sS and sT lie between
the unregulated high and low quality levels, so unilaterally selected minimum
standards are, indeed, mild.
Proposition 2 Unilateral minimum quality standards are always mild.
Proof. Since
∂Cj(sj)
∂sj = 0 at bs = 3.668 θb and ∂ΠLj(sj)∂sj = 0 at s = 0.27763 θb ,
then sjL that solves a convex combination of these in (49) must satisfy s < s
j
L <
20
bs. Moreover, since s > qURL and bs < qURH it is also true that qURL < sjL < qURH .
Hence, sjL is mild. Following a similar line of argument for s
j
H and noting that
sjH > 0, it is straightforward to show that s
j
H is also mild.
Tables (4) and (5) report the regulated market outcome under sS and sT ,
respectively. They show that consumer surplus is higher and profit from high
quality sales lower under sT than under sS . Furthermore, the tougher standard
corresponds to a smaller quality gap, indicating the lower degree of product
diﬀerentiation. Prices for both high and low quality goods are higher with the
tougher standard, as the convex variable costs eﬀect from the higher quality
levels outweighs the pro-competitive eﬀect of stronger price competition.
Regulated Equilibrium with High Quality Domestic Sales
Quality levels qHj = 0.42856 θb qLj = s
j
H = s
S = 0.23995 θb
Quality ratio rj = 1.8318
Quality gap qHj − qLj = 0.18861 θb
Prices pHj = 0.23487 θ
2
b pLj = 0.091475
θ
2
b
Quality-deflated prices xHj = 0.54805θ xLj = 0.391θ
Marginal consumer zj = 0.73685θ
Sales SHj = 0.26315θ SLj = 0.34585θ (imports)
Profits ΠHj = 0.013476 θ
3
b ΠLj = 0.012702
θ
3
b
Consumer surplus Cj = 0.050122 θ
3
b
Table 3: Regulated Equilibrium with High Quality Domestic Sales.
Regulated Equilibrium with Low Quality Domestic Sales
Quality levels qHj = 0.49272 θb qLj = s
j
L = s
T = 0.34691 θb
Quality ratio rj = 1.4203
Quality gap qHj − qLj = 0.14581 θb
Prices pHj = 0.27231 θ
2
b pLj = 0.15604
θ
2
b
Quality-deflated prices xHj = 0.55267θ xLj = 0.44979θ
Marginal consumer zj = 0.79743θ
Sales SHj = 0.20257θ (imports) SLj = 0.34764θ
Profits ΠHj = 0.0059831 θ
3
b ΠLj = 0.012407
θ
3
b
Consumer surplus Cj = 0.055502 θ
3
b
Table 4: Regulated Equilibrium with Low Quality Domestic Sales.
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4 Nash Equilibria in Minimum Quality Stan-
dards
Section 3.2 establishes minimum quality standards sS = 0.23995 θb and s
T =
0.34691 θb as the optimal unilateral policy decisions of national welfare-maximising
policy-makers in countries whose national firm supplies the domestic market
with high or low quality goods, respectively. Examination of the four configura-
tions of firm quality rankings show that there exist four non-cooperative Nash
equilibria in minimum standards: two symmetric Nash equilibria, where na-
tional minimum standards are either both ‘tough’ (sA = sB = sT ) or both ‘soft’
(sA = sB = sS), and two asymmetric Nash equilibria where one country sets
the soft standard and the other the ‘tough’ standard (sA = sS and sB = sT , or
sA = sT and sB = sS).
The multiplicity of non-cooperative Nash equilibria in minimum standards
arises from the multiplicity of equilibria of the firms’ strategic interaction in
prices and quality levels. It is interesting to note that asymmetric national
standards can arise endogenously even though markets are symmetric and the
duopolists have access to the same technology.
Consider the four configurations of firm quality rankings in A and B:
1. If qAA < qBA and qAB > qBB, then each firm supplies its home market
with low quality goods and trade is in high quality goods. Policy-makers’
incentives are symmetric and give rise to a symmetric Nash equilibrium
pair of standards
¡
sA∗, sB∗
¢
=
¡
sT , sT
¢
.
2. If qAA > qBA and qAB < qBB, then each firm supplies its home market
with high quality goods and trade is in low quality goods. Policy-makers’
incentives are again symmetric, but standards are less stringent due to the
negative eﬀect on the profits of the domestic firm. The Nash equilibrium
pair of standards is thus
¡
sA∗, sB∗
¢
=
¡
sS , sS
¢
.
3. If qAA > qBA and qAB > qBB , then firm A is the world high quality
supplier. Country B imports high quality goods from A while A imports
low quality goods from B. Policy-makers’ incentives are asymmetric such
that the policy maker in A has an incentives to set the ‘soft’ standard to
protect the interests of the high quality producing A firm, while policy-
makerB sets the ‘tough’ standard. The Nash equilibrium pair of standards
is thus
¡
sA∗, sB∗
¢
=
¡
sS , sT
¢
.
4. If qAA < qBA and qAB < qBB, then firm B is the world high quality sup-
plier and A exports low quality goods to country B. The Nash equilibrium
is again asymmetric, where
¡
sA∗, sB∗
¢
=
¡
sT , sS
¢
.
These results are summarised in proposition (3).
Proposition 3 Non-cooperative Nash equilibrium minimum quality standards
are higher when countries trade in high quality goods than if they trade in low
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quality goods. If trade flows vary in quality, then a higher minimum standard
is set by the country importing high quality goods than by the country importing
low quality goods.
Proof. If countries trade in high quality goods then national firms are low
quality suppliers in their home markets. Conversely, if trade is in low quality
goods, then national firms are high quality suppliers in their home market.
Moreover, if one country imports high quality goods and the other low quality
goods, then the national firm of the high quality importing country is the world
low quality supplier, while the other firm is the world high quality supplier. The
proposition then follows directly from proposition (1).
The key diﬀerence between the international duopoly and having both duopolists
in a single country is that only the profits of the national firm are incorporated
into each policy-maker’s objective function. At the same time, the trade links
between countries give rise to cross-country externalities from standard-setting
as each standard aﬀects the profits of the foreign firm.
In contrast to the widely explored negative terms-of-trade externalities of
the strategic tariﬀ-formation literature (e.g. Bagwell and Staiger, 1999, 2002;
Staiger and Tabellini, 1987), the cross-country externalities arising from mild
quality standards can be either positive or negative, depending on the qual-
ity of traded goods. Profits from low quality exports are increasing in foreign
minimum standards, provided these are not too severe, yielding a positive cross-
country externality. Profits from high quality exports unambiguously decrease
with foreign minimum standards, giving rise to a negative cross-country exter-
nality. The four Nash equilibria thus correspond to the four diﬀerent combi-
nations of externalities that may arise between the two countries: symmetric
positive externalities, symmetric negative externalities, or asymmetric positive
and negative externalities.
More formally, the externalities between countries A and B are reflected in
(50) and (51), which describe the impact that sB and sA have on WA and WB,
respectively, through their eﬀect on profit flowing abroad.
∂WA
∂sB
=
∂ΠAB
∂sB
T 0 (50)
∂WB
∂sA
=
∂ΠBA
∂sA
T 0 (51)
The sign of ∂ΠAB∂sB and
∂ΠBA
∂sA , respectively, depends on the quality of traded
goods, and thus on the pattern of trade. For example, if A exports high quality
goods to B, then even a very mild minimum standard sB imposes a negative
externality on A. Conversely, if low quality goods are exported, then for suﬃ-
ciently low sB, the externality on country A is positive. Since these positive or
negative external eﬀects do not factor into unilateral decision-making, the Nash
equilibrium standards are ineﬃciently high or ineﬃciently low relative to the
world optimum pair of standards that internalises these eﬀects.
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To examine the eﬃciency characteristics of the Nash equilibria, we derive the
eﬃciency condition for pairs of minimum quality standards. Then the world-
welfare maximising pair of standards is calculated and contrasted with the non-
cooperative policy outcome. This paves the way for the analysis of international
cooperation in quality standards that forms the rest of the paper.
4.1 Eﬃciency
Consider the welfare level of A from a given pair (sA, sB).
WA =WA(sA, sB) (52)
Consider an iso-welfare contour for A, that describes all the combinations
of national standards that yield the welfare level described in (52). Along the
iso-welfare contour, it must hold that:
∂WA
∂sA
dsA +
∂WA
∂sB
dsB = 0 (53)
Hence, the slope of the iso-welfare contour of A is given by:
∙
dsA
dsB
¸
|dWA=0
= −∂W
AÁ∂sB
∂WAÁ∂sA
(54)
Similarly along an iso-welfare contour for B, for constant welfare WB =
WB(sA, sB), it must hold that:
∂WB
∂sB
dsB +
∂WB
∂sA
dsA = 0 (55)
Hence, the slope of the iso-welfare contour of B is given by:
∙
dsA
dsB
¸
|dWB=0
= −∂W
BÁ∂sB
∂WBÁ∂sA
(56)
Substituting (44) and (45) into (54) and (56) allows the slopes of the coun-
try A and B iso-welfare contours to be expressed in terms marginal eﬀects of
national standards on consumer surplus and profit flows:
∙
dsA
dsB
¸
|dWA=0
= − ∂ΠABÁ∂s
B
∂CAÁ∂sA + ∂ΠAAÁ∂sA
(57)
∙
dsA
dsB
¸
|dWB=0
= −∂CBÁ∂s
B + ∂ΠBBÁ∂sB
∂ΠBAÁ∂sA
(58)
For a pair of minimum quality standards (sA, sB) to be eﬃcient, there must
be no possible Pareto improvement from (sA, sB), so the iso-welfare contours
must be tangential to each other at (sA, sB). The eﬃciency requirement is thus:
∙
dsA
dsB
¸
|dWA=0
=
∙
dsA
dsB
¸
|dWB=0
(59)
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Results from the examination of the Nash equilibria against eﬃciency con-
dition (59) are summarised in Proposition (4).
Proposition 4 The Nash equilibria in minimum quality standards are ineﬃ-
cient.
Proof. Recall the condition for eﬃciency
h
dsA
dsB
i
|dWA=0
=
h
dsA
dsB
i
|dWB=0
that
implies (57) and (58) must be equal for Nash equilibrium pair
¡
sA
∗
, sB
∗¢
to be
eﬃcient. Moreover, in order for the pair to constitute a Nash equilibrium, it
must be true that it solves the government reaction functions, (44) and (45).
However, if
¡
sA
∗
, sB
∗¢
satisfies both (44) and (45), then
h
dsA
dsB
i
|dWA=0
= ∞ >h
dsA
dsB
i
|dWB=0
= 0, thus violating the condition for eﬃciency.
4.2 World Optimum Minimum Standards
Let pair
¡
sA, sB
¢
=
¡
sWOA , s
WO
B
¢
denote the pair of minimum standards that
maximise world welfare W
¡
sA, sB
¢
, given by (60), where:
W
¡
sA, sB
¢
=WA
¡
sA, sB
¢
+WB
¡
sA, sB
¢
(60)
= CA
¡
sA
¢
+ΠAA
¡
sA
¢
+ΠBA
¡
sA
¢
+ CB
¡
sB
¢
+ΠBB
¡
sB
¢
+ΠAB
¡
sB
¢
Since each market has a low and high quality supplier with symmetric
costs and consumer preferences are identical across markets of equal size θ,
then by symmetry sWOA = s
WO
B = s
WO, where sWO = argmaxsW (s) =
2 [Cj (s) +ΠHj (s) +ΠLj (s)]. Thus sWO solves:
∂W
∂s
=
∂Cj (s)
∂s
+
∂ΠHj (s)
∂s
+
∂ΠLj (s)
∂s
= 0 (61)
Rearranging (61) yields the eﬃciency condition:
− ∂ΠHj (s)Á∂s
∂Cj (s)Á∂s+ ∂ΠLj (s)Á∂s
= −∂Cj (s)Á∂s+ ∂ΠLj (s)Á∂s
∂ΠHj (s)Á∂s
= 1 (62)
It follows directly from (62) that eﬃciency is satisfied at the world optimum.
Hence, the world welfare-maximising pair of minimum standards is shown to be
both symmetric and eﬃcient. The implication is that world welfare is max-
imised at a unique point, where both countries harmonise their standards at
sWO. Since the world optimum does not constitute a non-cooperative Nash
equilibrium, it may only be reached through cooperative agreement. The feasi-
bility of international cooperation at (sA, sB) = (sWO, sWO) is analysed in the
section 4.
Solving (61) yields the world optimum common standard sWO = 0.25241 θb .
It is observed to lie between the two optimal unilateral minimum standards
sS = 0.23995 θb and s
T = 0.34691 θb . This leads to Proposition (5).
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Intuitively, the cross-country externalities imply that when a government of
a country imposes a minimum quality standard, part of the costs (or benefits) of
the standard are borne by the trading partners of that country. As a result, each
government faces less than the full costs (or benefits) of the standard and hence
over (or under) provides regulation of quality relative to the world optimum
minimum standard that internalises the cross-country eﬀects.
Proposition 5 The world optimum standard (sWO) lies between the unilateral
‘soft’ standard (sS) and ‘tough’ standard (sT ).
Proof. Since sWO = argmaxscW (s), sjH = argmaxscW jH and sjL = argmaxscW jL,
where cW (s) = Cj(s) + ΠHj(s) + ΠLj(s), cW jH = Cj ¡sj¢+ ΠHj ¡sj¢ and cW jL =
Cj
¡
sj
¢
+ΠLj
¡
sj
¢
, then from the properties of ΠLj, ΠHj and Cj it follows that
sjH < s
WO < sjL.
Table (6) reports the solutions to all market variables under sWO, the world
welfare maximising (common) minimum quality standard.
World Welfare Maximising Market Outcome
Quality levels qHj = 0.43885 θb qLj = s
j = sWO = 0.25241 θb
Quality ratio rj = 1.7386
Quality gap qHj − qLj = 0.18644 θb
Prices pHj = θ
2
b pLj =
θ
2
b
Quality-deflated prices xHj = 0.54676θ xLj = 0.39958θ
Marginal consumer zj = 0.74601θ
Sales SHj = 0.25399θ SLj = 0.34642θ
Profits ΠHj = 0.012028 θ
3
b ΠLj = 0.012869
θ
3
b
Consumer surplus Cj = 0.051511 θ
3
b
Table 5: Market Outcomes Under the World Optimum Standard.
4.3 Non-cooperative Standard-Setting and Trade
Consider the implications of the over- or under-regulation of quality on the
trade flows between A and B. When countries trade in high quality goods,
the Nash equilibrium is symmetric and characterised by ‘tough’ standards in
both countries. These are more stringent than is optimal from a world-welfare
perspective, however, as a result of the bilateral negative externalities. Since
demand for high quality goods is decreasing in the minimum quality standard,
over-regulation implies lower demand for high quality goods in each country and
thus lower bilateral trade in these goods than is eﬃcient. The tougher standards
also imply the quality of traded goods is higher than is eﬃcient.
Conversely, trade in low quality goods gives rise to a symmetric Nash equi-
librium in which both countries set ‘soft’ standards, which are laxer than is
optimal from a world-welfare maximising perspective. For low quality goods,
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however, laxer standards imply less demand in each country, and thus lower
bilateral trade in low quality goods than is eﬃcient. Moreover, the quality of
traded goods is lower than is eﬃcient.
Similar arguments apply for the asymmetric Nash equilibria for the flows of
high and low quality exports, respectively. It follows that irrespective of the
quality level of traded goods, and thus for all patterns of trade, the ineﬃciency
in unilateral decision-making in quality standards operates as a non-tariﬀ bar-
rier to trade. Moreover, the result follows without any of the usual assumptions
that generate non-tariﬀ barrier eﬀects of minimum standards, such as certifica-
tion or labelling costs for firms to meet diﬀerent national standards or quality
modification costs that prohibit the customisation of quality to diﬀerent mar-
kets.
The discussion is summarised by proposition (6).
Proposition 6 Trade flows are lower under Nash equilibrium quality standards
than under world optimum standards.
Proof. Recall that ∂SHj∂sj < 0 and
∂SLj
∂sj > 0 for s ∈
³
qURL ,
bbs´ where bbs =
3.4104 θb . If both countries export high quality goods, then Nash equilibrium
standards are sA∗ = sB∗ = sT . From Proposition (5) it follows that sT > sWO,
so exports must be lower than under world optimum standards. If countries
trade in low quality goods, then Nash equilibrium standards are sA∗ = sB∗ = sS .
Proposition (5) implies sS < sWO . Moreover, since sWO < bbs then ∂SLj∂sj > 0
holds in the region of the Nash equilibrium and world optimum. Hence low
quality exports are lower in the Nash equilibrium than under world optimum
standards. Finally, if A exports high quality goods and B exports low quality
goods, then sA∗ = sS < sWO and sB∗ = sT > sWO. Thus high quality exports
of country A are lower under sB∗ = sT than under sB∗ = sWO. Furthermore,
country B’s low quality exports are lower under sA∗ = sS than under sA∗ =
sWO.
5 International Cooperation in Quality Standards
Section 3 establishes the ineﬃciency of the non-cooperative Nash equilibria in
minimum quality standards, as well as the eﬃciency of harmonisation of quality
standards at the world optimum. This section analyses the potential gains
from international cooperation between governments under the three distinct
trade patterns: trade in high quality goods, trade in low quality goods, and
bilateral trade in goods of diﬀerent qualities. A common feature of all three
cases is the Prisoners’ Dilemma structure in the incentives of the two policy-
makers. While countries stand to gain through a cooperative agreement, this
does not constitute a Nash equilibrium. Taking as given the minimum quality
standard of the other country, each policy-maker has an incentive to defect from
the cooperative agreement. The analysis follows the general approach used in
the analysis of cooperative agreements in tariﬀs (Bagwell and Staiger, 1999,
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2002) by examining Pareto-improving reciprocal adjustment of minimum quality
standards as a means of establishing the scope for cooperative agreement.
5.1 Bargaining from Symmetric Nash Equilibria
The two distinct trade patterns that give rise to a symmetric Nash equilibrium
are analysed in turn.
Trade in High Quality Goods
Proposition 7 If countries trade in high quality goods, then a cooperative agree-
ment in quality standards must involve a reciprocal lowering of minimum quality
standards from the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium.
Proof. If countries trade in high quality goods, then the national firms are
low quality suppliers in their home market. It follows from propositions (1) and
(5) that A and B set ‘tough’ standards unilaterally, denoted by sA
∗
= sB
∗
=
sT > sWO.
For a pair of standards
¡
sA0 , s
B
0
¢
to be welfare improving for both A and B
relative to the Nash standards
¡
sT , sT
¢
, it is necessary that sA0 < s
T and sB0 <
sT . This is shown to be true by considering the eﬀect of sB on WA. The
minimum standard in B aﬀects the welfare of A through its eﬀect on profit
from high quality exports. From the properties of ΠHj it follows that WA is
decreasing in sB. A symmetric argument applies for B, so WB is decreasing in
sA. The cross-country negative externalities are summarised by:
∂WA
∂sB
=
∂ΠAB
∂sB
< 0 (63)
∂WB
∂sA
=
∂ΠBA
∂sA
< 0 (64)
While each country’s welfare is decreasing in the quality standard of its trading
partner, the implicit reaction functions (44) and (45) imply that ∂W
A
∂sA |sB and
∂WB
∂sB |sA are independent of s
B and sA, respectively. The best responses of
governments A and B are thus sA∗
¡
sB
¢
= sT ∀sB and sB∗
¡
sA
¢
= sT ∀sA,
respectively. Hence, if sB0 > s
T , (63) implies the best attainable welfare for A
given sB0 is:
WA
¡
sA∗
¡
sB0
¢
, sB0
¢
=WA
¡
sT , sB0
¢
< WA
¡
sT , sT
¢
(65)
Similarly, if sA0 > s
T , (64) implies the best attainable welfare for B given sA0 is:
WB
¡
sA0 , s
B∗ ¡sA0 ¢¢ =WB ¡sA0 , sT ¢ < WB ¡sT , sT ¢ (66)
Inequalities (65) and (66) imply that if sA0 > s
T or sB0 > s
T then
¡
sA0 , s
B
0
¢
cannot
be Pareto improving relative to
¡
sT , sT
¢
for both A and B and thus cannot be
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the outcome of a cooperative agreement in standards. Hence for
¡
sA0 , s
B
0
¢
to be
a cooperative agreement both sA0 < s
T and sB0 < s
T must hold.
Figure (8) illustrates the incentives of the two policy-makers under the con-
figuration of firm qualities that generates trade in high quality goods. The
curves illustrated are plotted for parameter values b = 12 and θ = 5 using the
profit equations for high and low quality goods, consumer surplus and the qual-
ity reaction function of the high quality firm given in Appendix A.
The origin of the figure corresponds to no regulation, where sA = sB = qURL .
Iso-welfare contours WA∗ and WB∗ are drawn for the welfare level attained in
the symmetric Nash equilibrium, denoted by NE, where
¡
sA∗, sB∗
¢
=
¡
sT , sT
¢
,
while contours fWA and fWBcorrespond to the welfare of A and B from a coop-
erative agreement at the world optimum (WO), where sA = sB = sWO < sT .
Moreover, the dotted contour W ∗ reflects iso-world-welfare contour at the Nash
equilibrium level of welfare W ∗ =WA∗ +WB∗.
Consider the iso-welfare contours for each country. Higher welfare levels
correspond to contours closer to the axes, reflecting the cross-country nega-
tive externalities that apply. For each country, the unique, optimal unilateral
standard is sT , which reflects the optimal reply of each country to any stan-
dard set by the other. The welfare level of each is decreasing in the standard
of the other, so the highest welfare point is
¡
sA, sB
¢
=
¡
sT , qURL
¢
for A and¡
sA, sB
¢
=
¡
qURL , s
T
¢
for B.
The eﬃciency locus is denoted by EE, which plots all pairs of minimum
standards at which the iso-welfare contours of A and B are tangent. WO is the
eﬃcient, symmetric pair, which maximises world welfare. The ineﬃciency of NE
is confirmed since the iso-welfare contours of the two countries are not tangential
at NE, indicating scope for Pareto improvement. The core, enclosed by WA∗
and WB∗, gives the set of all Pareto-improving points relative to NE, within
which the darker segment reflects the contract curve of A and B, along which
cooperative pairs
¡
sA, sB
¢
are both eﬃcient and Pareto-improving relative to
NE.
Consider the opportunities for cooperation reflected in the figure. While¡
sT , sT
¢
is a Nash equilibrium, mutual gains can be reaped through a reciprocal
adjustment of minimum quality standards downwards, as follows from propo-
sition (7). Each reciprocal adjustment places countries on a lower, symmetric
contour (reflecting higher welfare), through which all gains from bargaining are
exhausted at WO.
The analysis confirms the potential welfare gains from cooperation, but also
highlights the Prisoners’ Dilemma structure of incentives. Points DA and DB
illustrated optimal defection points from cooperation for A and B, respectively.
If sB = sW0, then country A’s optimal reply is to defect to DA, by setting
sA = sT and thereby attaining a higher welfare level. While the scope for
Pareto-improving cooperation is established, the analysis raises concerns over
the enforceability of such cooperation.
In practice, national quality standards are developed by National Standards
Bodies. 153 of these national bodies are members of the International Orga-
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nization for Standardization (ISO), the world’s largest developer of standards.
While the ISO has greatly contributed to the development of international stan-
dards alongside national standards, it has no legal authority to enforce the im-
plementation of its standards. Despite the ISO’s large membership, and the
impetus it creates for the implementation of international standards, there are
still widespread diﬀerences in national standards.
Trade in Low Quality Goods
Proposition 8 If countries trade in low quality goods, then a cooperative agree-
ment in quality standards must involve a reciprocal raising of minimum quality
standards from the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium.
Proof. If countries trade in low quality goods, it follows from propositions
(1) and (5) that A and B set ‘soft’ standards unilaterally, denoted by sA
∗
=
sB
∗
= sS < sWO. Moreover, the implicit reaction functions (44) and (45) yield
sA∗
¡
sB
¢
= sS ∀sB and sB∗
¡
sA
¢
= sS ∀sA, respectively.
For a pair of standards
¡
sA0 , s
B
0
¢
to be welfare improving for both A and B
relative to the Nash standards
¡
sS , sS
¢
, it is necessary that sA0 > s
S and sB0 >
sS . If these conditions do not both hold, then at least on country has lower
welfare under
¡
sA0 , s
B
0
¢
than under the Nash equilibrium standards. From the
properties of ΠLj and since s > sS it follows that WA is increasing in sB and
WB increasing in sA in the region of the Nash equilibrium. The cross-country
externalities are thus positive and summarised by:
∂WA
∂sB
=
∂ΠAB
∂sB
> 0 for sB ∈
¡
qURL , s
¢
(67)
∂WB
∂sA
=
∂ΠBA
∂sA
> 0 for sA ∈
¡
qURL , s
¢
(68)
Hence, if sB0 < s
S the best attainable welfare for A given sB0 is:
WA
¡
sA∗
¡
sB0
¢
, sB0
¢
=WA
¡
sS , sB0
¢
< WA
¡
sS , sS
¢
(69)
Similarly, if sA0 < s
S the best attainable welfare for B given sA0 is:
WB
¡
sA0 , s
B∗ ¡sA0 ¢¢ =WB ¡sA0 , sS¢ < WB ¡sS , sS¢ (70)
From (69) and (70) it follows that if sA0 < s
S or sB0 < s
S , then
¡
sA0 , s
B
0
¢
cannot
be Pareto improving relative to
¡
sS , sS
¢
for both A and B and thus cannot be
the outcome of a cooperative agreement in standards. Hence for
¡
sA0 , s
B
0
¢
to be
a cooperative agreement both sA0 > s
S and sB0 > s
S must hold.
Proposition 9 From a symmetric Nash equilibrium in minimum standards,
mutually beneficial reciprocal adjustment of national standards increases na-
tional welfare monotonically for both countries until the world optimum is reached.
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Proof. Consider reciprocal changes in standards dsA and dsB from an
initial bargaining position at Nash equilibrium standards,
¡
sA
∗
, sB
∗¢
. If trade
is in high quality goods, then sA
∗
= sB
∗
= sT > sWO and from Proposition
(7) adjustments dsA < 0 and dsB < 0 from the Nash equilibrium are mutually
beneficial. Similarly, if low quality goods are traded, then sA
∗
= sB
∗
= sS <
sWO and from Proposition (8) adjustments dsA > 0 and dsB > 0 from the Nash
equilibrium are mutually beneficial. Since sA
∗
= sB
∗
, reciprocal adjustments
give rise to symmetric Pareto improvements until sA
∗
+
P
ds = sB
∗
+
P
ds =
sWO, where standards
¡
sWO, sWO
¢
are eﬃcient.
Figure (9) illustrates the strategic incentives of the two policy-makers where
trade is in low quality goods. As before, the curves illustrated are plotted for
parameter values b = 12 and θ = 5 using the profit equations for high and low
quality goods, consumer surplus and the quality reaction function of the high
quality firm given in Appendix A. All notation is as in figure (8).
The iso-welfare contours for countries that trade in low quality goods are
elliptical, as illustrated in the figure. In particular, the iso-welfare contours
for A and B form concentric ellipses that correspond to higher welfare as they
converge to the unique, preferred point of each country.
Consider the welfare of country A. Welfare level WA∗ is attained at the
Nash equilibrium (NE), where both countries set the ‘soft’ standard sS < sWO.
Welfare fWA from a cooperative agreement at the world optimum (WO) cor-
responds to an elliptical iso-welfare contour that lies within the contour corre-
sponding to the Nash equilibrium
¡
sA
∗
, sB
∗¢
=
¡
sS , sS
¢
. The unique, preferred
point of country A is denoted by W
A
, corresponding to the pair of minimum
standards
¡
sA, sB
¢
=
¡
sS , s
¢
. The intuition behind the shape of the iso-welfare
contours and preferred point W
A
lies in the positive cross-country externalities
between countries for minimum standards sj ∈
¡
qURL , s
¢
, which become nega-
tive for sj ∈
¡
s, sP
¢
, where s = 0.27763 θb = 2.7763 and s
P = 203 . Hence, at
sB = s = 2.7763, the profit from firm A’s low quality exports is maximised,
yielding the highest attainable welfare for A at
¡
sA, sB
¢
=
¡
sS , s
¢
. Similar
arguments apply for country B.
The dotted contour reflects the iso-world-welfare contour through the Nash
equilibrium point, corresponding to welfare level W ∗ = WA∗ +WB∗, and cen-
tred around the world welfare maximising WO point. The core, enclosed by the
intersection contours WA∗ and WB∗, gives the set of Pareto-improving cooper-
ative agreements, the eﬃcient of which lie on the contract curve, that forms a
subset of the eﬃciency locus EE.
Propositions (8) and (9) are reflected by reciprocal increases in standards sA
and sB, which increase welfare by ‘internalising’ the positive externalities drive
firms to under-regulate at the NE, relative to WO. These Pareto-improving
adjustments shift countries onto smaller and smaller concentric circles from
NE, which correspond to higher welfare levels, until eﬃciency is achieved at
WO where both iso-welfare contours are tangent. As with trade in high quality
goods, the Prisoners’ Dilemma structure exists, since countries A and B have an
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incentive to defect to DA and DB, respectively, from a cooperative agreement
at WO.
5.2 Bargaining from Asymmetric Nash Equilibria
This section examines the incentives and scope for cooperative agreement be-
tween the two countries from an initial asymmetric Nash equilibrium in mini-
mum quality standards. This corresponds to the trade pattern where one firm
ranks as the high quality leader in both markets, and the other firm is the
world low quality supplier. The resulting trade pattern is where one country
exports high quality goods, and finds it optimal to set minimum quality stan-
dard sS < sWO, while the other exports low quality goods, and sets sT > sWO.
The results point to scope for mutual gains from reciprocal adjustment in
minimum standards, but show that the asymmetric welfare measures and exter-
nalities (positive for one country and negative for the other) make a cooperative
agreement at the world optimum infeasible. The asymmetries between A and B
are such that the world optimum does not oﬀer a Pareto gain to both countries
and hence does not lie on the contract curve. In the absence of lump-sum trans-
fers that can correct for the asymmetries, the models shows that harmonisation
of minimum quality standards cannot form a cooperative agreement. This result
is similar to Mayer (1981) and Kennan and Riezman (1988), who show in the
context of tariﬀ negotiations that free trade may be unattainable if countries
are suﬃciently asymmetric8 in size.
The results are summarised by general propositions (10) to (14) and then
illustrated for particular parameter values.
Proposition 10 If trade flows vary in quality, then a cooperative agreement
reached from the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium must involve a higher stan-
dard in the high quality exporting country and a lower standard in the low quality
exporting country .
Proof. Suppose A exports high quality goods and B exports low quality
goods (or vice versa). It follows from propositions (1) and (5) that A sets a
‘soft’ standard and B a ‘tough’ standard unilaterally, where sA
∗
= sS < sWO
and sB
∗
= sT > sWO. The implicit reaction functions (44) and (45) yield
sA∗
¡
sB
¢
= sS ∀sB and sB∗
¡
sA
¢
= sT ∀sA, respectively. Equations (63) and
(68) imply a negative externality on A from sB
∗
= sT and a positive externality
on B from sA
∗
= sS . Hence for standards
¡
sA0 , s
B
0
¢
to be welfare improving for
both A and B relative to the Nash standards it is necessary that sA0 > s
S and
sB0 < s
T . If these conditions are not both satisfied, then at least one country
has lower welfare under
¡
sA0 , s
B
0
¢
than under
¡
sS , sT
¢
, as shown by (69) and
(66), and
¡
sA0 , s
B
0
¢
cannot be the result of a cooperative agreement.
8An important diﬀerence is that asymmetric Nash equilibria arise endogenously as a fea-
ture of the vertical product diﬀerentiation in this paper, and not as a result of assymetric
assumptions in country or firm characteristics.
32
Lemma 11 The world optimum does not lie on the contract curve of govern-
ments whose initial bargaining position is an asymmetric Nash equilibrium in
minimum standards.
Proof. Consider the asymmetric Nash equilibrium where A exports high
quality goods and B exports low quality goods, where Nash equilibrium stan-
dards are sA
∗
= sS < sWO and sB
∗
= sT > sWO. For the world optimum to
lie on the contract curve it must be both (i) eﬃcient and (ii) Pareto improving.
The world optimum is shown to be eﬃcient in section 3.3.2. Agreement at the
world optimum is shown not to be Pareto improving, however, by examination
of country welfare levels at the Nash equilibrium and at the world optimum:
Substituting sS = 0.23395 θb and s
T = 0.34691 θb into equation (25) yields
Nash equilibrium high qualities qHA(sS) = 0.42856 θb and qHB(s
T ) = 0.49272 θb .
Firm quality rankings imply q∗AA = qHA(s
S) = 0.42856 θb , q
∗
AB = qHB(s
T ) =
0.49272 θb , q
∗
BB = s
T = 0.34691 θb and q
∗
BA = s
S = 0.23395 θb . Substitution
of the equilibrium values in (42) and (43) yields Nash welfare levels WA∗ =¡
6.9585× 10−2¢ θ3b and WB∗ = ¡8.0616× 10−2¢ θ3b , respectively.
At the world optimum low qualities are qLA = qLB = sWO = 0.25241 θb . From
(25) the high quality best responses are qHA(sWO) = qHB(sWO) = 0.43885 θb .
It follows that3 qWOAA = q
WO
AB = 0.43885
θ
b and q
WO
BB = q
WO
BA = 0.25241
θ
b .
Substituting into (??) and (??) yields welfare levels at the world optimumfWA = ¡7.5567× 10−2¢ θ3b and fWB = ¡7.7249× 10−2¢ θ3b , respectively.fWA > WA∗ and fWB < WB∗ imply the world optimum is not Pareto improving
relative to the asymmetric Nash equilibrium and thus cannot lie on the contract
curve.
Proposition 12 From an initial asymmetric Nash equilibrium in minimum
standards, an agreement at the world optimum cannot be reached through Pareto
improving reciprocal adjustment of national standards.
Proof. This follows directly from lemma (11).
Lemma 13 From initial asymmetric Nash equilibrium minimum standards a
lump-sum transfer from the high quality to the low quality exporting country can
ensure mutual gains from a cooperative agreement at the world optimum.
Proof. Consider the asymmetric Nash equilibrium where A exports high
quality goods and B exports low quality goods. The proof of lemma (11) con-
firms that fWA −WA∗ > WB∗ −fWB. Thus any lump-sum transfer LAB from
A to B where LAB ∈
³
WB∗ −fWB ,fWA −WA∗´ ensures mutual gains from an
agreement at the world optimum.
Proposition 14 If lump sum transfers between countries are possible, then the
world optimum can be reached through international cooperation for all config-
urations of firm quality rankings.
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Proof. This follows directly from propositions (9) and (13).
Figure (10) illustrates the strategic incentives and opportunities for coop-
erative bargaining from the asymmetric Nash equilibrium where sA = sS and
sB = sT , corresponding to a quality ordering in each market where firm A is the
high quality supplier. As before, the curves illustrated are plotted for parame-
ter values b = 12 and θ = 5 using the profit equations for high and low quality
goods, consumer surplus and the quality reaction function of the high quality
firm given in Appendix A.
The asymmetric Nash equilibrium depicted contains elements of figures (8)
and (9) of the previous sections. Country A exports high quality goods, and thus
always loses welfare from the implementation of a binding standard in country
B, through the negative eﬀect on export profit. The iso-welfare contours for
A are thus increasing in welfare for lower sB , and centred around sA = sS ,
the optimal minimum standard for A. Welfare level WA∗ is attained at the
asymmetric Nash equilibrium.
Country B is an exporter of low quality goods to country A and thus ex-
periences a positive welfare eﬀect from the implementation of sA ∈
¡
qURL , s
¢
,
and a negative welfare eﬀect for sP ∈
¡
s, sP
¢
, giving rise to elliptical iso-welfare
contours. WelfareWB∗ corresponds to the welfare level at the Nash equilibrium.
The concentric dotted iso-world-welfare contours are centred around WO
and the eﬃciency locus EE passes through WO and into the core formed by
the two (reservation) iso-welfare contours at NE. The main observation is that
WO is not on the countries’ contract curve, so in the absence of lump sum
transfers, this point cannot be reached through reciprocal adjustment of sA and
sB . While country A gains from WO (relative to NE), country B experiences a
loss in welfare, since fWB < WB∗. Mutual gains from a cooperative agreement
are possible, for example at C, but the resulting agreement does not entail
harmonisation of standards and corresponds to a world welfare level lower than
at WO. Note that the Prisoners’ Dilemma structure in incentives continues to
apply, with DA and DB reflecting the defection points of A and B, respectively.
If lump-sum transfers are possible between countries, then a lump sum trans-
fer LAB = WB∗ −fWB is the smallest transfer consistent with cooperation of
B at WO. Under LAB, country B is indiﬀerent between NE and WO, while A
gains welfare relative to the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium.
Meza and Tombak (2007) introduce asymmetries in marginal costs and Jinji
and Toshimitsu (2004) assume asymmetric fixed quality-development costs to
obtain an endogenously determined quality ranking. For suﬃciently small cost
diﬀerentials, they each find a unique duopoly equilibrium in which the low cost
firm oﬀers high quality. Their results suggest that even small cost asymmetries
can eliminate symmetric Nash equilibria. If the quality ranking of firms is
preserved across markets through a cost advantage of one firm over another,
then only the asymmetric equilibria discussed survive.
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5.3 Cooperative Standard-Setting and Trade
Proposition 15 International cooperation in standard-setting raises trade vol-
ume relative to the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium for all configurations of
firm quality rankings.
Proof. Proposition (6) establishes that trade flows are lower under the
Nash equilibrium than under world optimum standards. Under symmetric ini-
tial conditions, Proposition (9) establishes that reciprocal mutual adjustments
in standards allow the world optimum to be reached. Hence international coop-
eration from a symmetric Nash equilibrium raises or lowers standards towards
the world optimum, thereby raising trade flows. Moreover, if lump sum trans-
fers can be made between countries, then Proposition (14) establishes that the
world optimum can be reached even under asymmetric initial conditions.
Pareto improving cooperation is possible even in the absence of lump-sum trans-
fers, however. Proposition (10) establishes that such cooperation must raise the
standard of the high quality exporting country and lower the standard of the
low quality exporting country, albeit not to the world optimum level. Since
∂SHj
∂sj < 0 and
∂SLj
∂sj > 0 for s ∈
³
qURL ,
bbs´, any cooperative agreement from an
asymmetric Nash equilibrium is trade enhancing.
6 Conclusion
This paper extends a well-established vertical product diﬀerentiation model
to an international setting where international duopolists compete in two seg-
mented markets. The framework is used to analyse governments’ incentives for
the unilateral setting of minimum quality standards, as well as the scope and
eﬀects of international cooperation on welfare and international trade. Firms
compete in qualities and prices internationally and incur variable costs of quality
improvement, allowing quality of domestic sales and exports to be diﬀerentiated.
National standards are endogenous and result from a standard-setting game be-
tween governments whose objective function is to maximise national welfare.
Multiple equilibria arise as a feature of the underlying vertical product diﬀer-
entiation model. Four non-cooperative Nash equilibria in minimum standards
are shown to exist, two symmetric and two asymmetric, depending on the quality
ranking of firms in each market. The framework delivers several new proposi-
tions. First, the analysis establishes that in all four cases, unilaterally selected
minimum quality standards are ineﬃcient as a result of cross-country external-
ities. Second, trade flows are shown to be lower under non-cooperative Nash
equilibrium standards than under a mutually beneficial cooperative agreement,
suggesting higher trade flows between countries that cooperate in standard-
setting than between countries that set minimum standards unilaterally. Uni-
lateral minimum standards are thus shown to operate as non-tariﬀ barriers to
trade.
In contrast to the widely explored negative terms-of-trade externalities of
the strategic tariﬀ-setting literature, the cross-country externalities arising from
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mild quality standards can be are either positive or negative, depending on the
quality of traded goods. Profits from low quality exports are increasing in for-
eign minimum standards, provided these are not too severe, yielding a positive
cross-country externality. Profits from high quality exports unambiguously de-
crease with foreign minimum standards, giving rise to a negative cross-country
externality. The four Nash equilibria thus correspond to the four diﬀerent com-
binations of externalities that may arise between the two countries: symmetric
positive externalities, symmetric negative externalities, or asymmetric positive
and negative externalities. Hence unilateral minimum standards may be ineﬃ-
ciently high or ineﬃciently low relative to the eﬃcient world optimum symmetric
standards.
Third, the existence of Pareto improving cooperative agreements from an
initial bargaining position at any of the four Nash equilibria, is established.
Moreover, the world welfare maximising symmetric standard can be reached
through reciprocal adjustments in national minimum standards from either of
the two symmetric Nash equilibria. These correspond to firm rankings that give
rise to trade in high quality goods only, or trade in low quality goods only. While
the underlying Prisoners’ Dilemma structure of the standard-setting game raises
concerns about enforcement of cooperative agreements, the theoretical results
show that an eﬃcient cooperative agreement to harmonise minimum quality
standards is feasible and mutually beneficial for countries that trade in goods
of similar quality levels.
Finally, the potential scope for mutually beneficial cooperation is shown
to be significantly restricted when cross-country externalities are asymmetric.
New propositions establish that although asymmetric countries can mutually
gain from cooperation, the resulting cooperative standards are asymmetric and
do not maximise world welfare. Cross-country asymmetries that arise endoge-
nously in equilibrium, and not by assumption, correspond to the setting where
trade is between a country who is a high quality leader and a country that
supplies both markets with low quality. The resulting contract curve does not
include the symmetric world optimum. While lump-sum transfers can correct
for this asymmetry, a mutually beneficial cooperative agreement at the world
optimum cannot be reached in their absence. The results suggest that suc-
cessful cooperation in the setting of minimum standards between high quality
and low quality exporting countries is less likely, particularly if the agenda for
cooperation is to harmonise minimum standards.
The paper provides a motivation for international cooperation in minimum
standards that stems from the ineﬃciencies of national decisions in an inter-
national context where countries are linked through trade, but also points to
potential diﬃculties in the realisation of successful cooperation as international
asymmetries hinder the incentives to implement jointly, but not individually,
beneficial harmonised standards.
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Appendix A. Quality Reaction Functions
The full expression for the high quality firm’s optimal quality response to an
unregulated low quality, qHj (qLj), or response qHj
¡
sj
¢
to a minimum standard
sj ∈
£
qURLj , s
Pj
¤
, is given below. Due to its length the country subscript j is
dropped and qHj (·) is given as qH (s). It is expressed in terms of the standard,
s, and the ratio of market size to cost, θb , denoted by m
qH (s) =
1
9
m+
11
36
s+A− 1
A
µ
5
324
ms− 1
81
m2 − 31
1296
s2
¶
where:
A =
µ
1
729
m3 − 1049
23 328
s3 +
503
7776
ms2 − 5
1944
m2s+B
¶ 1
3
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and:
B =
µ
1999
995 328
s6 − 1441
248 832
ms5 +
9803
2239 488
m2s4 − 119
279 936
m3s3 +
23
139 968
m4s2
¶ 1
2
The low quality firm’s reaction function with qLj (qHj) can be expressed in
terms of high quality qHj and the ratio of market size to cost denoted m. For
expositional convenience the country subscript j is dropped.
qL (qH) =
17
6
qH +D −
1
D
µ
7
6
mqH −
175
36
q2H
¶
where:
D =
Ã
1111
108
q3H −
95
24
mq2H +
µ
343
216
m3q3H −
7225
1728
m2q4H +
365
288
mq5H −
579
64
q6H
¶ 1
2
! 1
3
The unregulated Nash equilibrium quality levels reported in the text can be
found by solving qHj (qLj) and qLj (qHj) simultaneously. The polynomial ex-
pressions yield a number of solutions. All negative and complex solutions are
discarded, as well as those for which qHj < qLj . There is a unique real solution
for which qHj > qLj > 0.
The minimum quality standards ss, sT , sWO and threshold standards s, bs
and bbs referred to in the main text are found by substituting qHj ¡sj¢ into the
relevant equations for welfare, profit, sales and consumer surplus, which are
then expressed in terms of sj and market parameters b and θ only. Applying
optimisation techniques to these expressions, with respect to sj , yields the so-
lutions. All solutions described in the text have been computed using Scientific
Workplace.
Furthermore, all figures in the paper are plotted by substituting qHj
¡
sj
¢
into the relevant equations and setting parameter values b = 12 and θ = 5.
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